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EXCLUSIONARY ZONING OF
ABORTION FACILITIES
The legal battle over abortion did not end in 1973 with the United
States Supreme Court's grant in Roe v. Wade1 of constitutional protec-
tion to a woman's decision to have an abortion. Roe merely forced the
anti-abortion movement to devise other ways to restrict the availability
and inflate the cost of abortions.' At the local level, legislators often
enacted overly restrictive zoning ordinances, relying on the regulations'
strong presumption of constitutionality.3 Thus, even though such zon-
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. The various groups that oppose abortion struggle to have Roe overturned by
either constitutional amendment or reversal by the Supreme Court. Comment, Control-
ling Choices through the Back Door: Regulation of Abortion through Regulation of
Health Care Benefits, 54 UMKC L. REv. 291 (1986). These groups are consistently
more successful, however, in influencing passage of state and local legislation that cur-
tails the physical availability of abortion clinics.
Anti-abortion groups also lobby for regulations that raise the cost of the procedure
and render abortions unavailable to the poor. Id. Often these state regulations are
blatantly unconstitutional. For example, a Missouri statute decreed that life begins at
conception. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 1.205.1(1) (Vernon 1986). Roe clearly prohibited such
a legislative finding and the Missouri statute was summarily declared unconstitutional.
Reproductive Health Servs. v. Webster, 655 F. Supp. 1300, 1305 (W.D. Mo. 1987).
Also invalidated were regulations requiring doctors to perform costly tests to determine
gestational age, weight, and lung maturity when it is uncontradicted that these tests are
inconclusive and designed primarily for the health of the fetus. Id. at 1312.
The Missouri statute also restricted the use of public facilities in performing, encour-
aging, or counseling a woman to have an abortion when it is not necessary to save the
mother's life. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.215 (Vernon 1986). The court held that while the
state need not extend public funds to provide abortion services or counseling, it cannot
stop a hospital or other public facility from extending such services when the patients
are able to pay for them. 655 F. Supp. at 1320.
Webster illustrates the strength of anti-abortion groups in state legislatures. The case
also shows the willingness of states to regulate indirectly what they cannot regulate
directly. On the local level, when a clinic offers abortion services in a neighborhood,
pickets and protests are common. Occasionally, the protests escalate to harassment,
violence, and even bombing. Zoning is a municipality's principal means to control
protesters and indirectly regulate abortions. This Recent Development focuses on the
constitutionality of indirect regulation of abortion through zoning and delineates the
vague line between the permissible control of location and the impermissible exclusion
of a constitutionally protected activity.
3. Municipalities enact zoning ordinances under the broad authority of the police
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ing laws may implicate federal constitutional rights, federal courts are
unwilling to review zoning decisions as if they were "super zoning
boards."' When such regulations, however, place more than a de
minimis burden on the right to seek an abortion,5 the courts apply
strict scrutiny to determine whether the government has a compelling
interest in the ordinance.' The difficulty lies in the factual determina-
power. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (Court, for the first
time, recognized the validity and need for comprehensive zoning under the broad au-
thority of the police power). Separating industrial from residential uses in order to
preserve health and safety is a chief justification for zoning laws. Id. at 390.
The Euclid Court recognized that although an individual interest is unlikely to out-
weigh the benefits of a proper police power regulation, the possibility exists that a gen-
eral public interest could outweigh a zoning regulation. In such a case, the Court would
enjoin the zoning regulation. Id. In Roe v. Wade, however, the Court balanced the
state's interest in regulating childbirth against a woman's right to privacy during each
trimester of preganney and held that a woman's right to choose abortion is paramount
in the first trimester. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973). Any state regulation
during the first trimester must be for the mother's benefit and health. Id. at 163. The
rules regarding constitutional analysis, therefore, override traditional zoning rules.
While not altering a zoning board's traditional function, courts are recognizing that
zoning does not simply partition a territory into separate uses. Zoning laws reflect cer-
tain social choices and accommodations of conflicting social and political ideas that
extend far beyond the health and safety rationale of the police power.
For example, local governments have used zoning to exclude low income housing,
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977),
adult movie theaters ostensibly protected by the first amendment, Young v. American
Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976), and competition that might damage a munici-
pal project, Westborough Mall, Inc. v. City of Cape Girardeau, 693 F.2d 733 (8th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 945 (1983).
4. Generally, states provide administrative and judicial remedies through zoning
boards of appeal and state courts. Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action for
constitutional violations and ordinarily cannot be used to review local zoning decisions.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). See Raskiewicz v. Town of New Boston, 754 F.2d 38, 44 (1st
Cir. 1985) (court awarded summary judgment, attorneys' fees, and costs to the defend-
ants when plaintiff's fourteenth amendment due process and equal protection claims
were without merit), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 135 (1985).
5. The right to an abortion is part of a woman's right to privacy. In Roe v. Wade
the Supreme Court found that although privacy is not explicitly guaranteed in the Con-
stituion, it is "fundamental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." 410 U.S. at
152 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1973)). Regardless of whether
fourteenth amendment liberty or the ninth amendment reservation of fights to the peo-
ple guarantees privacy, the right to privacy "is broad enough to encompass a woman's
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." 410 U.S. at 153.
6. West Side Women's Servs. v. City of Cleveland, 573 F. Supp. 504, 516-17 (N.D.
Ohio 1983) (not all distinctions between abortions and other procedures are invalid;
lower level of scrutiny appropriate when the state is encouraging only alternatives to
abortion); Haskell v. Washington Township, 635 F. Supp. 550 (S.D. Ohio 1986) (ordi-
nance created a separate zoning class for abortion facilities but failed to zone any com-
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tion of what zoning laws constitute more than a de minimis burden.7
Much of the courts' involvement in the abortion rights area after
Roe began with, and continues to be in, their examination of laws that
interfere with the right to seek an abortion. In Maher v. Roe8 the
mercially available area for their development; this constituted more than a de minimis
burden).
7. Although pregnant women are clearly the most affected by a denial of abortion
facilities, they are empirically the least likely persons to challenge zoning statutes that
affect abortion facilities. In fact, doctors or agencies that provide abortions are the
primary foes of such zoning statutes. In Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976), the
Supreme Court asumed that doctors had standing to challenge a Missouri statute's re-
fusal to use state funds to finance abortions. The Court found that the doctors had a
direct personal economic interest in the outcome of the suit. The Court was split, how-
ever, as to whether the doctors had third-party standing to constitutionally challenge
the ordinance on behalf of their patients. Id. at 112-13.
The plurality set out what has become the generally accepted test for third-party
standing in these cases. See, e.g., Haskell, 635 F. Supp. at 555. First, the third party
must have a right that is "inextricably bound up with the activity the litigant wishes to
pursue." 428 U.S. at 114. In addition, "some genuine obstacle" to the ability of the
third party to assert his or her own right must exist. Id. at 115-16. In Singleton four
members of the Court found that patients or doctors are equally effective proponents
because of the confidential nature of their relationship. See also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S.
179, 188-89 (1973) (doctors consulted by pregnant women have standing because of
direct threat of personal detriment from prosecution under statute); Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965) (doctor and family planning counselor have standing
to raise constitutional rights of married people with whom they had professional rela-
tionship). The Roe constitutional protection is based, in part, on an unwillingness to
interfere with the doctor's and patient's decision to have an abortion. The Court in Roe
stated that "the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judg-
ment of the pregnant woman's attending physician." 410 U.S. at 164.
"Genuine obstacles" prevent the patient from asserting her rights. These obstacles
include a desire for anonymity and the "imminent mootness" of the claim. 428 U.S. at
116-17. A pregnant woman's claim is imminently moot because her right to an abortion
is paramount only in the first trimester. Because litigation usually takes longer than 12
weeks, the claim is moot at the time of trial.
Justice Stevens conceded that to consider "the effect of the statute on the constitu-
tional rights of ... patients" was appropriate, but stated that this did not necessarily
mean that courts could use the above analysis to grant a doctor third-party standing.
Id. at 121-22.
Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and Stewart and Chief Justice Burger felt that the plural-
ity's chimerical obstacles overstepped precedent. Id. at 126. They stated that women
could traditionally sue under an assumed name in order to protect their identities and
that class actions can avoid the mootness problem. Id. The dissenters also objected to
third-party standing because the statute in Singleton did not interfere with the doctor-
patient relationship, as such, but affected only Medicaid's financial arrangement with
the patient. Id. at 127-29. But see Haskell, 635 F. Supp. at 555; Family Planning
Clinic, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 594 F. Supp. 1410, 1413 (N.D. Ohio 1984); West Side
Women's Servs. v. City of Cleveland, 573 F. Supp. 504, 510-11 (N.D. Ohio 1983).
8. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
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Court set up a two-tiered standard to determine the validity of such
laws.9 The Court distinguished between "direct state interference with
a protected activity and state encouragement of an alternative activity
consonant with legislative policy."' Under Maher the state may pro-
vide counseling and other alternatives to abortion, even when the state
policy is to favor normal children over abortion. 1 When no "direct
interference" with the fundamental right to an abortion occurs, the
Court requires only that the law be rationally related to a legitimate
end. If the state policy, however, directly interferes with the right to an
abortion, the required demonstration of a compelling interest under
strict scrutiny is appropriate. 12
After Maher, lower federal courts were unwilling to apply strict
scrutiny to every case that affected a constitutionally protected right.
Courts viewed zoning laws as regulations of location and not as genu-
ine interference with the right to an abortion. For example, in Bossier
City Medical Suite v. City of Bossier City13 the court upheld a munici-
pal action denying an occupancy license to a medical clinic that wished
9. In Maher the patient sued the state in order to compel payment of Medicaid
benefits for abortions. The court stated that financial need alone did not make plaintiffs
a suspect class. Id. at 471. When a suspect class exists, such as race or ethnicity, courts
will strictly scrutinize the state interest to determine whether the interest is compelling.
When no suspect class or fundamental interest exists, however, courts will invalidate a
statute only if it is not rationally related to a legitimate governmental end. Id. at 478.
This difference is based largely in the burden of proof. When direct interference with a
protected right occurs, under Maher the burden is then on the state to prove a compel-
ling state interest. If rather than direct interference encouragement of alternatives to
abortion occurs, the burden is on the challengers to prove that the statute is irrational
with respect to its purpose or governmental goal.
10. Id. at 475-76.
11. Id. at 474, 477. The court in Maher suggested that the state was not required to
finance abortions for indigent women any more than it was required to finance private
and public schools. Id. at 477. A policy favoring childbirth is not per se unconstitu-
tional as long as the government is not erecting barriers to the right to seek an abortion.
Id. at 474. Use of legislative power to influence a woman's choice is not an improper
exercise of state authority, even when the legislation creates no "burden" at all. See
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians, 106 S. Ct. 2169, 2178 (1986) (statute
that required doctors to disclose a wide range of extensive and largely unnecessary in-
formation, including a description of the fetus, held unconstitutional because it intimi-
dated women in their free choice). See also Margaret S. v. Edwards, 794 F.2d 994 (5th
Cir. 1986) (state statute that required doctor to inform patient after the procedure of her
right to have the fetus buried or cremated is unconstitutional).
12. See infra note 14.
13. 483 F. Supp. 633, 639-40 (W.D. La. 1980).
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to perform abortions.14 A state statute classified abortion as a major
operation and the city had zoned the area only for medical offices and
minor surgery.15 The court held that plaintiffs could not simply ignore
the zoning laws. 16 Because no evidence of bad faith17 on the city's part
existed, the court applied a lower level of scrutiny, despite the existence
of "direct interference" with the right to an abortion under the Maher
standard. 18
While some courts, such as the court in Bossier City, were unusually
deferential to the legislature's finding that the zoning laws did not im-
plicate a fundamental right, later court decisions were not as deferen-
tial.19 In Deerfield Medical Center v. City of Deerfield Beach,2" for
example, the court found that the denial of an occupational license
under zoning laws is a direct interference with the right to an abor-
tion.2' The court stated that rather than merely refuse to lift previous
restrictions, such laws create new obstacles to the availability of an
abortion.22 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that the Deer-
field court misunderstood the Maher test by applying only a rational
14. Id. at 640.
15. Id. at 642.
16. The zoning classifications were in place when plaintiff purchased the property
for his abortion facility. The court was not sympathetic to the fact that he did not
inquire into the zoning laws at the time of the purchase. "A commercial enterprise
cannot disregard the land use regulations of a valid zoning ordinance merely because its
customers may be exercising a fundamental right." Id. at 648.
17. The court found that the zoning board acted in good faith despite an "ill-ad-
vised state court suit" in which the city alleged that it morally opposed abortion and
that no demand existed for the procedure. Id. at 650 n.35.
18. One explanation for the Bossier City result is that plaintiffs challenged only the
local zoning ordinance and not the state statute that classified abortion as a major sur-
gery. Id. at 642. As a result, the court accepted the legislative finding that abortion is
major surgery. Another possible explanation is that the court found no evidence of bad
faith. Id. at 639 n.5. Because the zoning ordinance and the state statute were both in
place before plaintiffs purchased the property, no evidence of an intent to restrict access
to a fundamental right existed. An intent to exclude renders the legislative purpose
illegitimate. The act, therefore, would be invalid under either or both tiers of the Maher
test.
19. See, e.g., Deerfield Medical Center v. City of Deerfield Beach, 661 F.2d 328 (5th
Cir. 1981); West Side Women's Servs. v. City of Cleveland, 573 F. Supp. 504 (N.D.
Ohio 1983).
20. 661 F.2d 328 (5th Cir. 1981). The district court opinion, which was summa-
rized and criticized in the appellate court decision, was not published.
21. Id. at 335.
22. Id.
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relationship test.2" Under the Maher test, strict scrutiny is required
when denial of a license directly affects the plaintiff's ability to provide
abortion services.24 In Deerfield the ordinance classified the abortion
clinic as a conditional use.25 This classification was a significant bur-
den on the protected rights because it postponed the clinic's availabil-
ity, chilled other developers, and cut off patient access.26
In West Side Women's Services (WSWS) v. City of Cleveland27 the
23. Id. at 336. The issue on appeal was whether a preliminary injunction was ap-
propriate. The court focused, then, on the likelihood of success on the merits. Id. at
333-34.
24. Id. at 334. Strict scrutiny is dependent upon plaintiff's ability to obtain third
party standing. Though the medical center's claim constituted a cause of action, the
center could assert only an economic loss rather than deprivation of a fundamental
right, so the appropriate standard of review was the rational relationship test.
Deerfield and Singleton applied a similar analysis. The Deerfield court relied on
Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (mail order contraceptive business
had standing to assert the rights of potential purchasers of contraceptives), and Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (beer vendor had standing to assert the equal protection
claims of underage men in a constitutional challenge to a statute that permitted women
but not men to drink at age 18), which both demonstrate that a vendor can assert the
constitutional rights of his customers. The Deerfield analysis, however, also concen-
trated on the Singleton factors: the relationship between the litigant and the third party
and the obstacles that prevent the third party from bringing suit.
25. State zoning laws usually allow municipalities, with zoning board approval, to
create special exceptions to zoning classifications. These special exceptions are called
conditional uses. The zoning statute must set out standards for these exceptions and,
generally, the special exception must be compatible with the surrounding zone. For
example, a zoning board might designate a certain area for industrial development only.
The board would then make a nuclear power plant a conditional use so that the devel-
oper would have to negotiate for prior approval from the board. This typical practice
gives the zoning board added control over development. See generally D. MANDELKER,
LAND USE LAW (1982).
26. The court also found that under strict scrutiny analysis the city's justification
for the ordinance was not compelling. The mere proximity of an abortion clinic to a
residential area and a Catholic church was not a compelling justification for refusing the
occupancy license, particularly because the residential area included other local busi-
nesses and medical office buildings.
Defendants also argued that the clinic would cause blight and deterioration of prop-
erty values similar to that observed in Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S.
50 (1976). In Young the establishment of adult movie theaters contributed to the crime
and moral degeneration of the surrounding area. Id. at 55. Deerfield Beach, however,
offered no evidence that an abortion clinic would have a similar effect on property val-
ues. By its own standards, the city permitted the revocation of licenses only on very
specific grounds such as fire hazard, excessive noise, or trash accumulation. The city
alleged none of these problems. 661 F.2d at 336-38.
27. 572 F. Supp. 504 (N.D. Ohio 1983). Plaintiff rented a facility zoned for local
retail business. Retail businesses included medical offices with five employees or less.
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court applied the Maher28 two-tiered test and stated that not all dis-
tinctions between abortions and other medical procedures are invalid.
The court also stated that courts should use a lower level of scrutiny
when the state only encourages alternative methods of childbirth and
does not interfere with the protected right to seek an abortion.29 The
court defined the undue burden or direct interference that triggers
strict scrutiny as anything greater than a de minimis burden.30  An
emergency ordinance prohibiting the licensing of any abortion clinic in
the local business district in this case was clearly more than a de
minimis burden because the clinic could not open without the license.3 '
Although strict scrutiny was appropriate, the court invalidated the or-
dinance under the lowest level of scrutiny.32
When zoning restricts access to a constitutional right, evidence of
When the city discovered plaintiff's development intentions, the city council passed an
emergency ordinance prohibiting the licensing of any abortion service within the local
business district. Id. at 506-07. Evidence showed that the emergency ordinance was in
response to public opposition to the abortion clinic and that the city's only express
justification was a general health, safety, and welfare incantation. Id.
28. The district court in WSWS interpreted Maher to allow the state to make a
value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion. The court decided that the local li-
censing requirement was such a value judgment and, therefore, applied the rational
relationship test. 450 F. Supp. at 798. The court then noted that no fundamental right
to perform abortions exists and stated that "[p]laintiffs are not prevented from treating
their patients-they are only restricted as to the location of their facilities." Id. at 798-
99. Although this conclusion would lead to a denial of the preliminary injunction, on
the trial of the constitutional issues the district court found that Roe protected both the
decision to have an abortion and also effectuation of that decision. 573 F. Supp. at 513.
The court stated, "[n]ot only may the state not interfere with the physician-patient rela-
tionship essential to the woman's decisionmaking process, but the steps it takes to re-
strict access to abortions to regulate the abortion procedure itself will also be closely
scrutinized." Id. See Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S.
416 (1983) (court recognized the need for a physician to act in his best medical judg-
ment and that the state could not impair that judgment through over-regulation of the
doctor's job). Whether the doctor can successfully assert that his right to perform abor-
tions is a fundamental liberty remains unclear.
29. At trial, the court found that the licensing requirement was not merely a value
judgment designed to encourage childbirth. Rather, the requirement raised new obsta-
cles and inhibited access to abortions. The court noted, however, that even if the city
designed the ordinance to exclude abortions in order to promote family values, the city
was unable to demonstrate the necessary rational nexus. Defendants presented no evi-
dence that a woman would carry her child to term simply because a zoning law made it
more difficult to find an abortion facility-the mother might travel further to find an-
other facility. 573 F. Supp. at 522.
30. Id. at 516.
31. Id. at 516-18.
32. Plaintiff, therefore, was entitled to summary judgment. Id. at 524. The city had
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available alternatives should mitigate the burden on that right.33 For
instance, no significant interference occurs if a city excludes abortion
clinics from one area of town, but permits them to operate a few blocks
away. A significant burden occurs, however, if the woman is in Shreve-
port, Louisiana, and the nearest clinic is in Dallas. Thus, if strict scru-
tiny is appropriate only when more than a de minimis burden on the
constitutional right exists, the availability of other clinics bears directly
on this issue. In WSWS, however, the court held that evidence of
available clinics is not relevant to determining whether the interference
is permissible.3 4 Other courts have followed this view and disallowed
evidence of geographic availability for purposes of showing the relative
burden on plaintiffs' rights.3 5
failed to present any evidence of a specific purpose for the emergency ordinance or
threat to health, safety, and welfare. Id. at 521.
The court also found that because the city officials could not provide any justification
for the ordinance, a question of fact existed as to whether the officials were acting in
good faith. Generally, city government officials are entitled to qualified immunity as
long as they act in good faith. See Fox Valley Reproductive Health Care Center, Inc. v.
Arft, 454 F. Supp. 784, 786 (E.D. Wis. 1978). Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), officials
may be personally liable for any damages resulting from their actions. The court re-
manded the case to determine whether the defendants had the proper intent. 573 F.
Supp. at 524.
The court also awarded plaintiffs interim attorney's fees. 594 F. Supp. 299, 302
(N.D. Ohio 1984). This award discourages defendants from causing further delay and
greater costs in order to force plaintiffs to settle for a lesser amount, and thus equalizes
the bargaining power of the parties.
33. For example, when an ordinance regulates the aesthetic values of commercial
speech and thereby implicates first amendment rights, the availability of other methods
of communication becomes an important factor in determining the extent of the burden
on those rights. See Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S.
789 (1984) (city aesthetic regulation banning paper political posters upheld when other
media forms were available to convey the same message). The distinction between such
ordinances and zoning ordinances impacting access to an abortion is not clear.
34. 573 F. Supp. at 518. "The question is not whether the activity may be engaged
in elsewhere, but whether it was constitutional to restrict [access to abortions] in the
manner chosen by defendants." Id. This implies that regardless of how many abortion
clinics are available in a given geographic location, the court would still find such a
licensing requirement unconstitutional. This conclusion is consistent with a facial at-
tack on the ordinance as distinguished from an attack on the statute's application to the
particular situation. Thus, if the ordinance is invalid on its face, reference to a specific
deprivation of right is inappropriate. See Family Planning Clinic, Inc. v. City of Cleve-
land, 594 F. Supp. 1410 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (plaintiff has just terti standing to represent
women who would use abortion facilities). Similarly, a plaintiff who launches a facial
challenge need not exhaust all administrative remedies before bringing suit. Fox Valley
Reproductive Health Care Center, Inc. v. Arft, 454 F. Supp. 784, 787 (E.D. Wis. 1978).
35. 594 F. Supp. at 1416-17.
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A total exclusion of a protected right from a geographic market is
generally per se unlawful.36 Courts, however, also invalidate zoning or-
dinances when a law excludes abortion clinics from just one zone. In
Family Planning Clinic v. City of Cleveland37 the court held that the
city could not eliminate a "potential clinic alternative" regardless of
the location of other clinics.3" Unlike Maher, the City of Cleveland
created new obstacles to obtaining an abortion rather than simply re-
fusing to remove old ones.39 Once the city excludes a clinic from a
residence-office district, the court reasoned, the city could later exclude
clinics from other districts.'
After Roe v. Wade, Cleveland amended its zoning ordinance to ex-
clude freestanding abortion clinics41 from an area designated for medi-
cal office buildings and multi-family dwellings.4' Although Chief
Judge Battisti criticized the expansive reading that the Supreme Court
and other federal courts gave to abortion as a fundamental right, the
court felt bound by precedent to declare this ordinance unconstitu-
tional.4 3 In sharp contrast to Bossier City,' the court invalidated the
36. See Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981) (total exclusion of
live entertainment from a municipality violates the first amendment).
37. 594 F. Supp. 1410 (N.D. Ohio 1984).
38. Id. at 1417. In Family Planning a preexisting zoning ordinance permitted devel-
opment of hospitals and clinics as long as these facilities did not include specific classes
of care. These categories included abortions, treatment of contagious diseases, insanity,
epileptics, and drug or liquor patients. Id. at 1412-14. The city denied the license. Id.
at 1412.
39. Raising new obstacles to access to abortion is tantamount to a direct interfer-
ence with the right and as such requires strict scrutiny of the state interest in the ordi-
nance. In Maher the court considered the refusal to distribute public funds for
abortions for indigent women as preservation of the status quo and not as the creation
of new obstacles to access. 432 U.S. at 474-76.
40. 594 F. Supp. at 1417.
41. Id. at 1419. A freestanding clinic is not physically connected to a hospital or
other medical center.
42. See supra note 40. In Family Planning the ordinance was poorly drafted and
contained wide loopholes. The court stated that a strict reading of the ordinance would
permit solo practitioners but not partnerships to perform abortions. In practice, how-
ever, the city never issued an abortion license. 594 F. Supp. at 1415. The ordinance was
also unconstitutionally vague because the city failed to adequately define "clinic." Id. at
1415-16. Without this definition a doctor would not know until he was prosecuted
whether or not his office was a "clinic." Id.
43. 594 F. Supp. at 1419. Chief Judge Battisti also decided and wrote the district
court opinions in WSWS. See 450 F. Supp. 796 (N.D. Ohio 1978) (preliminary injunc-
tion denied) and 573 F. Supp. 504 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (plaintiff's motion for partial sum-
mary judgment granted).
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exclusion despite no evidence of bad faith45 and despite the fact that
the exclusion applied only to a single district.4 6 The different outcome
in these two cases demonstrates that courts are less tolerant of zoning
ordinances that single out abortion clinics as a separate class.47
Despite this general lack of tolerance for separate treatment of abor-
tion clinics, the court in Haskell v. Washington Township4 8 created a
potential loophole to this popular view when a doctor filed suit chal-
lenging a 1982 zoning resolution that limited abortion facilities to a
zone that was not available for development. 49 The resolution also
44. See supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text.
45. Theoretically, bad faith is not a factor under the Maher two-tier test. See supra
notes 9-11 and accompanying text. The Maher test questions whether an undue or
more than a de minimis burden occurs and not whether the purpose of the burden was
improper. Similarly, the bad faith of the legislative body in excluding clinics should not
be a factor when plaintiffs made a facial challenge to the statute. The statute, if facially
unconstitional, is unconstitutional on its own terms and not because of the legislators'
intent. As a practical matter, if bad faith exists in the drafting process, courts tend to
use strict scrutiny whether or not the law places more than a de minimis burden on the
protected right. In both Bossier City and Maher no evidence of an improper legislative
purpose existed. In both cases the state was successful under a rational relationship
test. Maher, 432 U.S. at 478; Bossier City, 483 F. Supp. at 650. In WSWS, however, the
city passed an "emergency ordinance" intending to exclude the proposed abortion
clinic. 573 F. Supp. at 507. The court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs. Id.
at 524. While evidence of bad faith is relevant to whether the asserted state interest is
compelling and to whether the purpose of the ordinance is a legitimate governmental
objective, it should have no impact on the threshold question of what standard of scru-
tiny is appropriate.
46. 594 F. Supp. at 1418. As in WSWS, the size of the market and the geographic
location of other abortion facilities is not a relevant factor. This factor, however, is not
crucial because the city failed to show why abortion clinics should be treated differently
from other medical facilities or why such clinics do not belong in a residence-office
district. Id.
47. The exclusion of all medical clinics is much easier to justify than having to show
why an abortion clinic, but not an emergency medical clinic, should be excluded. Here,
the city passed the amendment excluding abortion clinics soon after the Roe decision.
Absent any evidence to the contrary, the court said that the statute was as likely to have
the unlawful purpose of restricting access to a constitutional right as it was to have a
lawful purpose. Given the lack of any compelling justification, the court declared the
denial of plaintiff's license unconstitutional. Id. at 1419.
48. 588 F. Supp. 528 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (defendant's motion to dismiss granted); 624
F. Supp. 634 (S.D. Ohio 1985) (plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment
granted).
49. 588 F. Supp. at 529. Dr. Haskell filed suit after a series of harassing incidents.
He originally took out a five-year lease in a medical office building. On October 6, a few
days after plaintiff executed the lease, the township trustees held a public hearing at
which the neighbors' opposition to the clinic's opening became clear. Id. at 529-30. On
October 18, the trustees began legal proceedings against the owners of the building al-
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classified abortion clinics as a controlled use, 50 so that if land in this
zone became available, those interested in opening an abortion clinic
would have to first get special approval from the Zoning Board of
Appeal.
Plaintiff argued that because abortion is a fundamental right, strict
scrutiny is appropriate for any law that places more than a de minimis
burden on a woman's freedom of choice. Once such an impingement is
established, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant, who must as-
sert a compelling state interest that justifies the impingement.5 1 Plain-
tiff argued further that because the defense failed to explicitly assert
any justification for the resolution, summary judgment was appropri-
ate.52 Defendant argued in rebuttal that genuine question of fact ex-
isted as to whether the ordinance placed more than a de minimis
burden on the right to an abortion.53 Deciding that the right to an
abortion includes "not only the decision, but also the effectuation of
the decision to abort a pregnancy," 54 the court held that the burden on
the plaintiff's right to access was more than de minimis because the
ordinance completely excluded abortion clinics from the township.
The court stated that the zone's limited acreage alone was enough to
establish a substantial impact on that right and therefore justify use of
the strict scrutiny standard.55
Although defendant did not assert any justification for the ordi-
leging off-street parking problems, despite the fact that the city had previously approved
the building's parking plan. The plaintiff abandoned his plan to put the medical center
in the building, id. at 530, and the suit was dismissed for lack of an injury. The court
found that the suit was dismissed for lack of an injury. The court found that the plain-
tiff abandoned his plans prior to passage of the resolution and had failed to allege any
present intent to open a clinic. Id. at 531. Dr. Haskell later purchased two lots on
which to build the clinic to demonstrate his intent to open the facility. 635 F. Supp. at
551.
The area zoned for abortions was unavailable because a cement plant completely oc-
cupied the zone's 3.3 acres. Id. at 558. The district court found that this effectively
banned abortions in Washington Township. 588 F. Supp. at 530.
50. For definition of controlled use, see supra note 25.
51. 635 F. Supp. at 558.
52. Id. at 556.
53. Id. The city also argued that a 1986 amendment to the resolution rendered
plaintiff's claim moot. The court dismissed this argument in a single paragraph, stating
that even if the 1986 resolution was constitutional, plaintiff was entitled to sue under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 to recover for injuries incurred between 1982 and 1986. Id. at 562. In
any event, the court also invalidated the 1986 resolution for vagueness. Id. at 561-62.
54. Id. at 556 (quoting WSWS, 573 F. Supp. at 513).
55. Id. at 558. Because the court found strict scrutiny appropriate given the limited
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nance, the court gleaned three legislative purposes from depositions
taken of township trustees.56 These purposes were (1) a policy to up-
hold life over death;57 (2) a desire to insulate elected officials and the
abortion zoning decision from political controversy by transferring the
zoning decisions to the Zoning Board of Appeal, which is an appointed
rather than an elected body;58 (3) a need to control the influx of pa-
tients from outside the township.59
After discounting the first two justifications, the court6" held that
local governments have a compelling interest in controlling traffic, con-
gestion, and noise through zoning.61 But in an unusual analysis, the
court applied an extra balancing test and held that the compelling in-
terest in traffic control did not outweigh the fundamental right to an
abortion. 62 The court, therefore, granted partial summary judgment
and held that the resolution was unconstitutional.63
nature of the zone, the court did not reach the issue of whether classifying abortion
services as a conditional use is, by itself, more than a de minimis burden.
56. Id. at 559.
57. Id. This argument is more sophisticated than it appears. Under Maher, the
state is permitted to exercise a policy of favoring childbirth over abortion as long as the
policy does not erect new obstacles to access to the fundamental rights. 432 U.S. at 474.
In this case the city clearly imposed new obstacles when the 1982 resolution classified
abortion services in an unavailable zone. Prior to the resolution, the zoning laws did
not distinguish between abortion and other medical facilities. The resolution forced
doctors to seek separate zoning classifications and to split their practice between abor-
tions and all other medical treatments. 635 F. Supp. at 559. The court treated this
burden on the doctors in offering abortion services as a burden on the fundamental right
itself.
58. 635 F. Supp. at 559-60. If the township trustees made the decision to include
abortion facilities in a blanket business zone, then voters could overrule that decision by
referendum. Given the public opposition to the clinic, such a referendum was likely
even if contrary to Supreme Court policy. The trustees were also preserving their ownjobs by avoiding a patently unpopular decision. When the plaintiff publicized his deci-
sion to open a facility, the trustees decided to make abortion clinics a controlled use
under the Zoning Board of Appeal's jurisdiction. The inference is that the 1982 resolu-
tion was a response to plaintiff's announcement and that any public benefit justification
was illusory and less than compelling. Id. at 559-61.
59. Id. at 560. Generally, in B-1 zones, the business catered to a neighborhood
clientele, and in B-2 zones, the customers were community-wide. A B-3 zone included
anything that drew a clientele from outside of the community. The court assumed that
the only rationale for these classifications was the increased traffic, noise, and parking
problems associated with a larger drawing business. Id. at 560-61.
60. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
61. 635 F. Supp. at 560.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 560-61.
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The court's analysis of the right to seek an abortion is confusing in
that the court adhered to established constitutional doctrine in its
choice of tests, but utilized an unprecedented version of the test's appli-
cation. The court's use of strict scrutiny under the facts of this case
was both appropriate and consistent with the widely accepted view that
total exclusion of a protected business is per se unlawful.' 4 While
courts will generally defer to the local zoning board if the exclusion is
rational and does not infringe on some constitutional right, the total
exclusion of a fundamental right clearly exceeds the protective thresh-
old of the de minimis burden test.
The court's version of strict scrutiny analysis, however, is without
precedent. Under standard strict scrutiny analysis, regulations that
place a substantial burden on the abortion decision "must be justified
by a compelling state interest, and will be deemed invalid if the profer-
red justifications are not substantial enough to justify the burden im-
posed."'65  The court in Haskell used a slightly different two-step
approach: (1) whether the proferred justification is compelling in the
abstract; and (2) if so, whether the compelling municipal interest out-
weighs the nature and the degree of the burden.66 The Haskell court
assumed that traffic, noise, and parking problems were compelling mu-
nicipal interests, 67 but determined that they did not outweigh the inter-
est in protecting a fundamental right.6 ' This is a balancing test, not
strict scrutiny. Strict scrutiny is a set of rigid presumptions designed to
avoid the pitfalls of balancing tests that provide trial judges with no
decisional framework except their own judgment. One of the purposes
of higher scrutiny is to remove this discretion in order to ensure the
uniform protection of fundamental rights. Thus, if a court finds that a
64. Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981) (total exclusion of live
entertainment is a first amendment violation).
65. WSWS, 573 F. Supp. at 517.
66. 635 F. Supp. at 557-61.
67. Id. at 560. Little precedent exists for this assumption. See Davenport v. City of
Alexandria, 683 F.2d 853 (4th Cir. 1892) (smooth flow of traffic is a compelling safety
interest supporting the city's ban of a bagpiper from performing on public sidewalks
when performances actually interfered with the traffic flow). See also Hickory Firefight-
ers Ass'n v. City of Hickory, 656 F.2d 917 (4th Cir. 1981) (city's interest in preserving
access to public buildings and maintaining vehicular and pedestrian traffic flow is suffi-
ciently compelling to allow restrictions on the first amendment by a picketing
ordinance).
68. 635 F. Supp. at 560. The Haskell court's reliance on WSWS is misplaced. The
WSWS court did not mention the balancing of state and private interests. See 573 F.
Supp. at 517.
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compelling state interest exists, the challenged statute is presumed con-
stitutional. Although this analytical difference was not crucial to the
outcome of Haskell, it may change the verdict in other cases in which
the burden imposed on the abortion decision is not so egregious.6 9
A related issue upon which the courts have not yet ruled is whether
local governments may zone businesses that involve controversial but
protected fundamental rights when the government's intent is to legiti-
mately control location rather than totally exclude the business. Many
courts assume that such regulations are constitutionally valid, though
some tension exists between views like those expressed in Bossier City7"
and Haskell. The court in Bossier City assumed that no fundamental
right to perform abortions exists and that doctors seeking to open clin-
ics are subject to zoning laws.71 Under this view, legitimate zoning
regulation of even protected businesses is in the public interest. Zoning
laws do not prevent doctors from treating their patients; the laws
merely regulate the location of the facility.72
In Haskell the court found the city's classification of abortion facili-
ties as a controlled use unconstitutional. Because developers were now
forced to request a rezoning, the court reasoned that the township had
imposed a substantial burden on the right to obtain an abortion.73 The
opinion, however, is not clear as to whether this burden is always un-
constitutional or whether it is only unconstitutional on the facts of this
case because the city failed to assert any compelling justifications.
Although the controlled use designation in Haskell requires special
69. The phrase "balancing test" in Haskell may have been poorly chosen and just
semantically different from actual strict scrutiny analysis. In individual rights cases, the
trial judge determines whether the state interest is more important than the individual
rights. By labeling certain individual interests as "fundamental" and certain state inter-
ests as "compelling," courts imply that both of these interests are very important. But
because no individual right is absolute, the state always wins in a standoff between com-
pelling state and fundamental individual interests. The word "compelling" in this con-
text means that the state interest is overriding. Thus, the balancing test is incorporated
into the determination of whether the state interest is compelling. Further balancing, as
in Haskell, is therefore unnecessary.
70. See supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text.
71. 483 F. Supp. at 648. See also WSWS, 450 F. Supp. at 798 (reversed on other
grounds).
72. 450 F. Supp. at 799.
73. 635 F. Supp. at 560. The city argued that the plaintiff never applied for rezon-
ing after purchasing the property. The court, however, responded that "the process of
rezoning in itself imposes a substantial burden on those who desire to provide abortion
services." Id.
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permission from a zoning board of appeals in order to establish an
abortion facility,7 4 this would not be per se unconstitutional under the
Bossier City court's rationale.
Thus, courts have not provided a clear resolution to the issue of
whether a city may impose reasonable zoning restrictions that have an
incidental effect on a woman's protected right to seek an abortion. In
other areas involving the zoning of constitutionally protected busi-
nesses, such as the zoning of adult movie theaters and book stores,
75
courts have taken the position that these businesses are subject to the
zoning laws even though the laws place some burden on protected
rights. 76 In Playtime Theatres v. City of Renton77 a city ordinance that
zoned pornographic book stores because of their secondary effects78
was not unconstitutional for placing some burden on the businesses.
79
Thus, in the abortion clinic context, the zoning of abortion clinics, be-
74. 635 F. Supp. 556-60. The language in Haskell is very broad. The opinion is not
clear as to whether the 1982 ordinance is unconstitutional because (1) evidence of har-
assment existed; (2) the ordinance imposed a controlled use requirement; (3) the B-3
zone contained no available acreage; (4) the city did not provide any justification for its
actions; or (5) some combination of the above. Id.
75. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 62 (1976) (merely subject-
ing protected material to zoning and other licensing requirements is not sufficient reason
for invalidating the law); Felix v. Young, 536 F.2d 1126 (6th Cir. 1976) (the zoning of
adult theatres was subject only to the rational relationship test when the state passed an
ordinance under its liquor regulatory power).
76. See, e.g., Playtime Theatres v. City of Renton, 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (zoning of
adult theaters is permissible to avoid blight and declining property values). The district
court in Haskell distinguished City of Renton because City of Renton applied only to
obscene materials that have limited first amendment protection. This is consistent with
the general notion that the nature of the right asserted determines the standard of re-
view. See Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
77. 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (dispersal zoning ordinance stopped adult movie theaters
from operating within 1,000 feet of any single or multiple residential district).
78. Id. The secondary effect in City of Renton was a well documented history of
crime, prostitution, drug dealing, sodomy, and deterioration of property values that
surrounded adult book stores and movie theaters. Id. at 44. See also Young v. Ameri-
can Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 54 (1976) (findings by the Detroit Common Council
that some uses of property, if concentrated in limited areas, are injurious to the
neighborhood).
79. 475 U.S. at 44-45. The ordinance implicated the first amendment rights of these
businesses, but because it did not purport to regulate the speech itself, the court uheld
the ordinance. In the abortion context, effective zoning is not an overly broad solution
to the blight problem as long as the city permits such proprietors to compete with other
businesses for land. A city cannot exclude protected businesses, but must permit them
to "fend for themselves in the real estate market, on an equal footing with other pro-
spective purchasers." Id.
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cause of their "secondary effects," should be constitutionlly permissi-
ble. These effects would include excess traffic, noise, and possibly
demonstrations and picketing. 0 While the secondary effects of a clinic
are not as obvious or well-documented as the blight described in Play-
time Theatres, traffic and demonstrations can damage property values.
The protection of property values is a legitimate reason for zoning."'
The special zoning of businesses that involve controversial but con-
stitutionally protected rights can be a tool for harassment and abuse.
Zoning laws designed to regulate business locations are, however, im-
portant and legitimate means of protecting public health and safety.
Fundamental rights, on the other hand, need strong protection against
possible abuse, but these protections should not be so inflexible as to
inhibit genuine regulation of secondary effects.
Elizabeth B. Meyer
80. 635 F. Supp. at 560. By upholding traffic and safety as a compelling justification
for the ordinance, the court in Haskell admits that the zoning board has an interest in
pursuing legitimate zoning goals. The secondary effects doctrine, however, makes more
sense intellectually than classifying business and trade as compelling interests. The traf-
fic involving an abortion clinic is normally not any greater than that of any other medi-
cal office facility. A few additional cars do not warrant the adjective "compelling."
81. 475 U.S. at 45.
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